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Despite its brutality and blatant violations of international law
and human rights, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which is observing
its tenth anniversary in 1989, has produced a constitution that compar-
ative scholars will find both educational and intriguing. It is educa-
tional because it constructs a modern legal structure to house tradi-
tional Islamic values; it is intriguing because it attempts to carve out a
new identity for an Islamic state built upon the idea of Islamic egali-
tarianism. The Iranian Constitution incorporates the principles of so-
cialist justice and roots them into the framework of Islamic values, as if
these principles had always been inherent to Islamic orthodoxy. Thus
the Iranian Constitution, drafted and enacted by none other than the
hard-core Islamic clergy, is founded upon the thesis that an Islamic
state, no matter how fundamentalist its orientation or origin, is essen-
tially an egalitarian state-but rooted of course in the will of God.1
According to the Iranian vision of Islam, a socialist state without God
corrupts and subverts the course of human development, as does a cap-
italist state where accumulation of wealth and maximization of profit
become the center of human attention.2 While rejecting both secular
socialism and corruptive capitalism, the Iranian Constitution gives new
meaning to the concept of "Islamic socialism" by attempting to synthe-
size socialist justice with Islamic standards.'
Islamic socialism, some have argued, is a phrase without meaning,
a contradiction in terms, as it combines Islam and socialism, which are
inherently incompatible." For example, Islam focuses upon creating a
* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University. M.A., 1972, LL.B., 1976, Punjab
University; LL. M., 1980, J.S.D., 1983, New York University.
1. IRANIAN CONST. art. 2, para. 1, §§ 1, 3, 6.
2. Id. preamble (the economy is a means, not an end).
3. M. FISCHER, IRAN: FROM RELIGIOUS DISPUTE TO REVOLUTION 231 (1980). "It has
been well said that the Western revolutionary tradition stresses the individual freedom,
sometimes at the expense of economic justice, that the Eastern (Communist) revolution-
ary tradition stresses economic justice at the expense of freedom, and that the Shi'ite
promise is one of combining freedom and justice." Id.
4. M. KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE 222 (1984).
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community to serve God; 6 but socialism, at least in its original Marxist
sense, rejects religion as a palliative, which confuses and retards the
dynamics of class struggle.' Since total submission to God is the cen-
tral part of Islamic faith, Islam may never be reconciled with socialism
which rejects God as a reactionary human artifact. From a Marxist
viewpoint, it may be argued that even if Islam contains some egalita-
rian precepts, the fact remains that over the centuries Islam has been
the religion of both the rich and the poor, the privileged and the
wretched, the oppressor and the oppressed. This shows that Islam has
failed to generate among its followers class consciousness and dialecti-
cal understanding of economic relations, which is the foundation of so-
cialist thought.' Accordingly, Islam is at best irrelevant to the eco-
nomic struggle that socialism undertakes; at worst, it is a reactionary
weapon that capitalists may use to blunt any socialist reconstruction in
an Islamic society.8
These critics make good points. Islamic socialism is a discom-
forting phrase-almost a linguistic oddity-which blends together in
the same breath two militant and seemingly divergent ideologies, by
ignoring rather unabashedly the differences that exist between them.
The term "Islamic socialism" therefore has failed to muster support in
the Islamic community. More palatable labels such as "Islamic equilib-
rium" and "Islamic egalitarianism," however, have been proposed to
facilitate the joining of Islamic standards with modern egalitarian prin-
ciples.' While the term Islamic socialism remains a red herring, the
concept underlying the term continues to assert itself in many, if not
all, Islamic states.10
Of course, total reconciliation between Islam and socialism is im-
possible. But there are areas where the two might be in harmony. Even
though no complete synthesis of Islamic and socialist standards of jus-
tice has yet emerged, 1 almost all Islamic countries have incorporated
into their economic systems some egalitarian measures without re-
nouncing or compromising Islamic standards. 2 Islamic egalitarianism
joins together two powerful ideas, one stressing human spirituality, the
5. Id. at 72-76.
6. H. COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW 4 (1984) (Marxism rejects spiritual revelation as a
source of social change and insists that the material conditions of life determine the
future path of human civilization).
7. M. RODINSON, ISLAM AND CAPITALISM 214-35 (1973).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. A. HOURANI, ARABIc THOUGHT IN THE LIBERAL AGE 1798-1939, at 299 (1962).
11. M. KHADDURI, supra note 4, at 223.
12. Id.
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other distributive justice. The idea of joining religion with social justice
is neither profound nor original; yet, its special appeal lies in its revival
and not in its novelty, particularly for those Islamic societies which
want to maintain their separate identity in a world divided between
capitalists and socialists.1 3 The most recent and perhaps the most pow-
erful endorsement of Islamic egalitarianism has taken place in Iran.'
Islamic egalitarianism embodied in the Iranian Constitution is an ide-
ology." Its goal is to create a prosperous society free of economic ex-
ploitation. Its ultimate aim, however, is not simply to satisfy the mate-
rial needs of man, but to subject him to the will of God.' 6 It rejects the
notion that human behavior is motivated by individual self-interest; 7
instead, it emphasizes virtue and provides a strong and stable moral
structure to give meaning and direction to human activity.' Above all,
it restores a permanent relationship between man and God. Thus, Is-
lamic egalitarianism is a spiritual ideology. In this sense, it is distin-
guishable from secular socialism that considers the human relationship
with God irrelevant, if not detrimental, to human progress and human
excellence.19
While spiritual restoration of man remains the distinctive goal of
Islamic egalitarianism (as the Iranian Constitution repeatedly empha-
sizes), it shares several characteristics with secular socialism. In order
to explore these shared characteristics, this Article examines the prin-
ciples embodied in the Iranian Constitution and compares them with
those incorporated in the 1977 Soviet Union Constitution (Soviet
Union Constitution).20 Of course, these constitutions are founded upon
13. J. VOLL, ISLAM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE MODERN WORLD 158-65 (1982)
(the author explains the historical evolution of socialist radicalism in Islamic states and
points out how Moslem scholars paved the way for receiving Marxist ideas into Islam).
14. The Iranian Constitution does not employ the phrases Islamic socialism or Is-
lamic egalitarianism. In fact, Iran may resent the assertion that its constitution is based
upon Islamic egalitarianism. The Iranian clergy may argue that Islam offers a complete
way of life and, therefore, it does not need any additive concept such as egalitarianism.
15. Ideology may be defined as "a critique of a given sociopolitical order that simul-
taneously describes that order and calls upon its members either to defend and preserve
it or to overthrow and transform it." Humphreys, The Contemporary Resurgence in the
Context of Modern Islam, in ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD 69 (A. Dessouki
ed. 1982).
16. IRANIAN CONST. art. 2, para. 1, §§ 1, 3.
17. See generally J. PLAMENATZ, KARL MARX'S PHILOSOPHY OF MAN (1975) (Marxism
rejects the notion that human nature is essentially selfish).
18. IRANIAN CONST. art. 3, § 1.
19. H. COLLINS, supra note 6, at 4.
20. Because the purpose of this Article is to identify in a broad sense the similarities
that exist between the two constitutions, no attempt is made to explain the nuances that
each constitution may contain. In addition, both constitutions are examined at the tex-
1988]
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fundamentally different ideologies: the Soviet Constitution is designed
to construct a classless communist society where the church is sepa-
rated from the state, and the school from the church; the Iranian Con-
stitution aims at creating an environment favorable to the develop-
ment of moral virtues where the state plays a constructive role in the
evolution of mankind leading toward God.2 1 This is perhaps the most
significant contradiction between secular socialism and Islamic egali-
tarianism. But despite these divergent visions, there exist striking simi-
larities between the two constitutions, particularly in areas of the
state-run economy, governmental authority, distributive justice, civil
and political freedoms and foreign policy. Recently, under Mikhail
Gorbachev's doctrines of Perestroika and Glasnost, the 1977 Soviet
Union Constitution has been amended to effect some structural
changes in the government and to relax control over civil and political
freedoms. This Article, however, compares the Iranian Constitution
with the original 1977 Soviet Union Constitution without new amend-
ments. This comparison is more meaningful because at the time the
Iranian Constitution was drafted and promulgated, the 1977 Soviet
Union Constitution was intact in its original form and text. In other
words, if the 1977 Soviet Union Constitution inspired the drafters of
the Iranian Constitution, any new amendments to the 1977 Soviet
Union Constitution, which have been made after the promulgation of
the Iranian Constitution, are irrelevant to the extent that they did not
influence the drafting of the Iranian Constitution.
Just like the Soviet Union Constitution, the Iranian Constitution
possesses the following attributes. First, the Iranian Constitution re-
jects capitalistic modes of production and prohibits concentration of
wealth in private hands.22 It allows the state to own the main means of
production for systematic and well-planned growth and management
of economic forces.22 Accordingly, it subordinates individual economic
activity to social interests and egalitarian principles.
24
Second, it allows the state to institute a form of government in
which the ultimate decision-making authority remains vested in the
guardians of ideology who are able and willing to carry out social and
tual level and, therefore, this Article does not provide any insights into the historical,
cultural or political context in which these constitutions were framed. The reader may
also keep in mind that constitutions are often inspirational documents and they do not
necessarily reflect the existing realities. Thus, there may be a gap between law on paper
and law in action.
21. IRANIAN CONST. art. 2, para. 1, § 3.
22. Id. art. 43.
23. Id. arts. 43-45.
24. Id. arts. 43-44.
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economic policies consistent with egalitarian justice. 5 Democratic in-
stitutions such as an elected legislature and executive are not allowed
to subvert the course of social and economic development.1
6
Third, the Iranian Constitution incorporates the principles of dis-
tributive justice and grants citizens basic social and economic protec-
tion. It furnishes all citizens with basic social and economic rights in-
cluding the right to work, the right to education and the right to
housing. Just like the Soviet Union Constitution, the Iranian Constitu-
tion assumes the responsibility to provide each citizen with the basic
necessities of a decent and dignified life.1
7
Fourth, it recognizes civil and political freedoms of individuals,
but subjects these freedoms to communitarian interests and moral
standards. 8 Thus, while individual enjoy freedoms of speech, religion
and association, they may not use these freedoms to reject fundamen-
tal principles of collective morality or to undermine social and eco-
nomic policies. 9
Fifth, just as the Soviet Union Constitution builds, promotes and
defends world socialism, the Iranian Constitution advocates the bring-
ing together of all Islamic societies to join them into one grand Islamic
community. This espoused Islamic solidarity hopes to establish a di-
vine order under which the oppressed upon the earth shall rise up for
their rights and regain their lost leadership.30
If Islamic egalitarianism as embodied in the Iranian Constitution
succeeds in establishing similar constitutional regimes in Islamic states
other than Iran, interesting new developments might take place on the
world scene. For example, close ties might develop between socialist
and Islamic communities, posing new international problems for the
West. On the other hand, it is also likely that those Soviet Republics,
which are predominantly Moslem, may begin to reject secular socialism
in favor of Islamic egalitarianism, thus destabilizing both the ideology
and the boundaries of the Soviet Union. While these questions are im-
portant, this Article does not explore the impact of Islamic egalitarian-
ism on future international events. Rather, it examines shared charac-
teristics that exist between the constitutions of Iran and the Soviet
Union. This constitutional kinship between Iran and the Soviet Union
highlights the compatibility that the Iranian Constitution has found
between Islamic standards and socialist principles, and enhances un-
25. Id. art. 91.
26. See infra notes 75-102 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 103-36 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 137-61 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 162-76 and accompanying text.
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derstanding of Islamic egalitarianism.
II. OWNERSHIP OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION
Over the centuries, the concept of economic justice has intrigued
human societies. Given the scarcity of economic and social goods, there
have always been societies in which part, if not a majority, of the popu-
lation lived in poverty. Even though economic inequality is still a fix-
ture of human civilization, almost all modern societies have shown
some commitment to alleviate the condition of the poor."1 On the other
hand, new ideologies have emerged in human thought that give the
poor a militant consciousness to protest against systems built upon
privileges and deprivations. Socialist thought, for example, stresses the
idea of a unified movement against the private ownership of the means
of production that it considers to be the major source of economic in-
justice.8 2 Even though one may question whether socialism is an effec-
tive method to bring about social equality and prosperity, socialist
thought offers a form of rebellion against economic oppression. "
Although Islam does not offer a coherent theory of economic jus-
tice, it prescribes general guidelines that Moslems may follow in their
economic transactions and economic relations. To understand the Is-
lamic conception of economic justice, Islam may first be distinguished
from other religions that prohibit or discourage any form of economic
activity, creating a belief among their followers that God will provide
them with their daily meals. 3 4 Islam allows commercial activity, and
merchants have always been held in respect in Islamic communities.3 5
Moreover, there is nothing in Islam that prohibits private ownership;
in fact, the Koran lays down the rules of inheritance.3 ' The stiff pun-
ishment that the Koran prescribes for stealing further shows that Is-
lam protects private property."7 Even though Islam allows acquisition
of private property, it embodies several egalitarian principles. For ex-
ample, it chides with contempt the concentration of wealth in private
31. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). This covenant recognizes
rights such as the right to food, work, housing and medical care. See id.
32. H. COLLINS, supra note 6, at 102-03.
33. See generally G. COHEN, KARL MARX'S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE (1978).
34. M. RODINSON, supra note 7, at 14.
35. In Iran, for example, merchants cooperated with the clergy in opposing the
Shah's regime and made voluntary contributions to finance anti-government action. See
M. PESARAN, IRAN: A REVOLUTION IN TURMOIL 16-17 (H. Afshar ed. 1985).
36. See Koran 2:180, 240; 4:7-9, 11-12, 19, 33, 176.
37. Id. 5:38. (as to thief, male or female, cut off his or her hands).
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hands8 and prohibits charging excessive interest on loans made to the
needy. 9 It mandates that the employer pay wages to the laborer4 0 and
that Muslims set aside every year a prescribed part of their savings for
the welfare of the poor."' These rudimentary, though important, prin-
ciples may be interpreted and extended to suggest that Islam empha-
sizes an egalitarian economic system.
But Islamic egalitarianism does not answer the more critical ques-
tion of who should control the means of production-a question cen-
tral to the debate between capitalism and socialism. Since private
property is protected in Islam, a good case may be made that Islam
does not oppose private ownership of the means of production. On the
other hand, it may be argued with equal force that Islam is incompati-
ble with capitalism which encourages concentration of wealth and max-
imization of profit. Whether Islam is compatible with socialism or capi-
talism is a question that may not have a precise answer.
The Iranian Constitution rejects both capitalism and Godless so-
cialism.4 2 And yet, it has taken a major step toward bringing Islam
closer to socialist principles of production and distribution. In fact, it
establishes an economic system quite similar to that of the Soviet
Union. For example, the Iranian Constitution embraces a conception of
Islam that allows the Islamic state to control the main means of pro-
duction.4 '3 And the reason the Iranian Constitution prohibits concen-
tration of wealth in private hands4 4 is to assure that the community as
a whole, and not just part of the population, receives the fruits of the
economy. It is in this context that a comparative study of the Soviet
and the Iranian conceptions of ownership provides useful insights into
the Iranian attempt to found its economy upon a mixture of Islamic
and socialist principles.
Article 10 of the Soviet Union Constitution states that socialist
ownership of the means of production is the foundation of the eco-
nomic system.4 '5 The principal form of socialist property is the property
that the state owns. This includes the land, its minerals, waters and
forests; the basic means of production in industry, construction and
agriculture; means of transport and communication; banks; most urban
38. Id. 3:180; 4:37; 47:37,38.
39. Id. 2:275-76, 278-80; 3:130.
40. Id. 18:76-78; see also M. RODINSON, supra note 7, at 14.
41. Koran 2:43, 110, 177, 277; 4:162.
42. IRANIAN CONST. preamble (the economy is a means, not an end).
43. Id. art. 44.
44. Id. art. 43, § 2.
45. KONST. SSSR art. 10, para. 1.
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housing; and other property necessary for state purposes.' In theory,
state property belongs to all the people; in reality, the state owns it,
protects it and provides conditions for its growth.'1 Since socialist
property belongs to all, no individual may use such property for per-
sonal gain or other selfish ends. 48
Even though individual citizens are excluded from the ownership
of socialist property, they have the constitutional protection to own
personal property, which includes articles of everyday use, a house and
earned savings. 9 They may also be granted the use of plots of land for
growing fruit and vegetables, for keeping livestock and poultry, or for
building an individual dwelling." Article 13 of the Soviet Union Con-
stitution, however, requires the holders of such plots to make rational
use of the land and seek assistance from the state in working their
small-holdings. 1 Article 17 permits some private economic activity in
handicrafts, farming and the provision of services for the public. Such
private initiatives are regulated by law to ensure that they serve the
interests of society."2 The concept of personal property is based on the
principle of earned income;58 therefore, in no case may personal prop-
erty be used as a means of deriving unearned income."' Yet consistent
with these legal restrictions, individuals may own and even inherit per-
sonal property.
The Iranian Constitution does not employ the phrase "socialist
property." Nonetheless, Article 44 of the Iranian Constitution creates a
46. Id. art. 11.
47. Id; see J. RESHETAR, THE SOVIET POLITY 227-28 (1978).
48. KONST. SSSR art. 10.
49. Id. art. 13, para 1; see Butler, Soviet Law 172 (1983).
50. KONST. SSSR art. 13, para. 2.
51. Id. art. 13, para. 2; see also A. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
USSR (1982):
It is well known that subsidiary farming has filled large gaps in Soviet agricul-
tural output, providing in some cases as much as half the total produce mar-
keted. What is perhaps less well known is that the share of the urban population
in the private agricultural sector has been steadily increasing, and, in both culti-
vated area and output, is now roughly equal to that of the collective farmers.
The constitution acknowledges this development and, in a sentence added in the
final version of article 13, even enjoins the state and the collective farms to assist
in the running of subsidiary farming.
Id. at 189. But see J. RESHETAR, supra note 47, at 227 ("The denial of freedom of eco-
nomic enterprises, except on a most limited individual scale, has made nearly all citizens
the equivalent of government employees, and very few are permitted to be self-
employed.").
52. KONST. SSSR art. 17.; see A. UNGER, supra note 51, at 190.
53. KONST. SSSR art. 13, para. 1.
54. Id. art. 13, para. 3.
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huge public sector that the state owns and administers. State property
includes all large-scale and major industries, major mineral resources,
banking and insurance; means of transport and communication includ-
ing aviation, shipping, railroads, radio, television and telephone ser-
vices; energy, dams and large-scale irrigation networks; and foreign
trade.5 5 Just like state property in the Soviet Union, state property in
Iran belongs to the people, but it is the state that owns and adminis-
ters it." It is here that the Iranian Constitution brings Islam and so-
cialism in close proximity; in the name of Islam, it grants the state
ownership of the main means of production and excludes private activ-
ity in fundamental economic spheres.
Next, the Iranian Constitution adopts a conception of private own-
ership which seems a little broader than that which exists in the Soviet
Union, but the close kinship between the two is evident.5 7 For example,
individuals may engage in agriculture, animal husbandry, industry,
trade and services; 58 and they may retain the fruits of their legitimate
business and labor.5 9 Private ownership may not be used, however, as a
pretext to deprive others of the opportunity to work.60 Further, these
concepts of personal property and private initiative are fettered with
several restrictions similar to ones found in the Soviet Union Constitu-
tion. For example, private ownership is protected by law on the condi-
tion that it contributes to the economic growth and progress of the
country, and that it does not harm society." In addition, Article 47
emphasizes that the private property must be legitimately achieved.2
Article 49 allows the government to confiscate private wealth resulting
from illicit sources including usury, usurpation and misuse of govern-
55. IRANIAN CONST. art. 44, para. 2.
56. Id. art. 44, para. 5.
57. Id. art. 47.
58. Id. art. 44, para. 4.
59. Id. art. 46.
60. Id.
61. Id. art. 44, para. 5. For general comments on the changes in the Iranian economy
as a result of the "new" system, see Karimi, Economic Policies and Structural Changes
Since the Revolution, in THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 32-53
(1986); H. AFSHAR, IRAN: A REVOLUTION IN TURMOIL 220-40 (1985):
After four years of Islamic government in Iran the deep contradictions of Shiia
ideology have remained unresolved. The revolution was to help the poor and yet
remain within a theoretical framework that does not favour egalitarian measures
nor provide any means for their implementation. Shiism is frequently seen as
the religion of the oppressed, yet it does not oppose inequalities and does not
provide for radical distribution of wealth.
Id. at 237-38.
62. IRANIAN CONST. art. 47.
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ment contracts and transactions."
Article 44 of the Iranian Constitution allows private investments
in agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, trade and services." But
this individual freedom to do business, though greater than that availa-
ble in the Soviet Union, may not be confused with the freedom that
individuals have in a market economy such as that of the United
States. The principles embodied in the Iranian Constitution empower
the state to control the economy. First, state ownership of major indus-
tries and means of transport and communications reject the notion of a
market economy. Second, private investments are expected to "supple-
ment" economic activities of the state.6" Thus, private initiatives seem
to have been subordinated to the state economic plan. Third, the con-
stitution prohibits extravagance and wastefulness in all matters related
to the economy, including consumption, investment, production, distri-
bution and services." This means that the state can intervene in pri-
vate business decisions and may prohibit the manufacturing, distribu-
tion and consumption of products that it considers extravagant or
wasteful.
It is interesting to note that both constitutions embrace the con-
cept of collective/cooperative ownership.6" This form of ownership is
distinguishable from both private property and state property in that a
group of individuals own a collective or a cooperative property. Article
12 of the Soviet Union Constitution allows collective farming and coop-
erative undertakings for the production of agriculture and other
goods." Likewise, Article 44 of the Iranian Constitution allows cooper-
ative companies and institutions, established in both cities and the
countryside, for the production and distribution of goods."
Thus, both constitutions create three forms of ownership: state
property, collective property and private property. Even if the three
forms of ownership existing in Iran and the Soviet Union may differ in
detail, the conceptual framework seems identical. Both constitutions
create an economic system in which the state owns the major means of
production and the private initiative is limited and subject to the
larger interests of society.
Furthermore, both constitutions regulate the effects of the eco-
63. Id. art. 49 (but confiscated wealth will be placed in the public treasury only if no
legitimate owner can be identified).
64. Id. art. 44, para. 4.
65. Id.
66. Id. art. 43, § 6.
67. Id. art. 44; cf. KONST. SSSR art. 12.
68. KONST. SSSR art. 12.
69. IRANIAN CONST. art. 44, para. 3.
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nomic system upon other spheres of human life. For example, both
constitutions mandate that economic activities must not harm the en-
vironment. Article 18 of the Soviet Union Constitution states that the
necessary steps must be taken to make rational use of natural re-
sources and to preserve the purity of air and water and to improve the
human environment.7 0 Likewise, Article 50 of the Iranian Constitution
forbids economic and other activities that pollute the environment or
inflict irreparable damage on it; it further states that the preservation
of the environment is a public duty." Both constitutions present the
preservation of environment as an inter-generational question. Both
invoke the needs of present and future generations to suggest that the
present generation has a duty to preserve and the future generations
have a right to inherit a clean environment.
7 2
Both constitutions state, almost in identical language, that the ec-
onomic system is not merely a means to generate material wealth, it
must also assist human beings in their overall growth and develop-
ment. Article 15 of the Soviet Union Constitution points out that the
supreme goal of social production under socialism is the fullest possible
satisfaction of the people's growing material, cultural and intellectual
requirements. 73 Similarly, Article 43 of the Iranian Constitution states
that the Islamic economic system must provide individuals with suffi-
cient opportunity and strength to engage in intellectual, political and
social development.7 4 It rejects economic systems in which the accumu-
lation of wealth and the maximization of profit constitute an end in
itself. Such economic goals are against Islamic principles; they corrupt
human beings and subvert their spiritual and intellectual
development.7
III. THE HOLDERS OF STATE AUTHORITY
The communist revolution in the Soviet Union and the Islamic
revolution in Iran have created similar forms of government in which
the true holders of state authority shall be none other than the guardi-
ans of the revolution. In both systems, even though the legislature and
the executive are comprised of elected officials, the real authority to
legislate as well as to govern rests not with the elected officials but with
those who would continue to protect and advance the cause of the
70. KONST. SSSR art. 18.
71. IRANIAN CONST. art. 50.
72. Id.
73. KONST. SSSR art. 15, para. 1.
74. IRANIAN CONST. art. 43, § 3.
75. Id. preamble (the economy is a means, not an end).
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revolution. This structure of authority is distinguishable from repre-
sentative democracy, which offers a form of government rooted in the
will of the people but does not guarantee the perpetuation of the will
of the revolution. In a democracy, since the outcome of popular elec-
tions is unpredictable, there is no assurance that elected officials will
continue to support the revolution. In fact, any form of government
that derives its authority from periodic and genuine elections may not
be suitable to protect and consolidate an ideological revolution. Revo-
lutionary regimes in the Soviet Union and Iran have therefore designed
similar structures of centralized authority that will protect them both
from enemies of the revolution and from the people who may become
disillusioned with the promise of their respective revolutions. They
have established similar forms of government in which the state au-
thority is vested in and devolves upon those who believe in the revolu-
tion and whom the revolution can trust.
In the Soviet Union, for example, the real decision-making author-
ity, both in legislative and executive matters, vests in the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union ("CPSU").76 Founded by Lenin as the van-
guard of the working class, the Party now presents itself as the party of
the Soviet people as a whole. 7 Since the October Revolution, the Party
has extended its guiding influence to all spheres of social life. 71 In the
1936 Constitution the Party is defined as the "leading core of all orga-
nizations of the working people," both government and non-govern-
ment.79 Likewise, Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution states that the So-
viet Communist Party is the leading and guiding force of Soviet
society: The Party determines the course of domestic and foreign pol-
icy, provides leadership to all state and public organizations and im-
parts a planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character
to the framework for the victory of communism."
76. M. GLENDON, M. GORDON, & C. OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 715-22
(1985) [hereinafter M. GLENDON].
77. KONST. SSSR art. 6.
78. J. HAZARD, THE SOVIET SYSTEM Or GOVERNMENT 290 (1980). The Rules of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union state that "[ildeological and organizational unity,
monolithic cohesion of its ranks, and high degree of conscious discipline... [constitute]
an inviolable law of the CPSU... [Even though one may] discuss freely questions of...
Part[y] polic[y], [the Rules reject] [a]ll manifestations of factionalism." Id. at 290-92.
"Democratic centralism, [the principle of the organizational structure of the Party, man-
dates] subordination of the minority to the majority [and] [t]hat the decisions of [the]
higher bodies are obligatory for lower bodies." Id. at 295-96.
79. KONST. SSSR art. 12 (1936).
80. KONST. SSSR art. 6, para. 2; see A. UNGER, supra note 51, at 185-86: "All these
processes taking place in this country's life were led and continue to be led by the Com-
munist party - the directing, organizing and mobilizing force of our society from the time
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Even though the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union is tech-
nically the supreme executive body,"' the actual authority resides in
the Politburo of the CPSU.8s For example, all past and present chair-
men of the Council of Ministers have been simultaneously full mem-
bers of the Politburo of the CPSU.8a In addition, the Party supervises
and controls all appointments considered politically important.8" In
fact, all state and social organizations operate under close scrutiny of
the Party."8 This control over state organizations gives the Party the
final executive authority both to provide policy directives and to super-
vise their execution." Thus the Party in general and the higher Party
officials in particular act as political guardians of the Soviet system.
The Party is not only the supreme executive, it is also the supreme
legislature. Again, even though the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union
is technically the supreme legislative body in the country," the general
guidelines regarding the future development of Soviet law are deter-
mined by the Party.88 The laws enacted by the Supreme Soviet reflect
and incorporate social, economic and political policies that the Party
adopts. It is unlikely that the Supreme Soviet would enact a law to
which the Party disapproves. The legislature enacts what the Party
recommends and the judges uphold what the legislature enacts. The
Soviet Constitution does not provide any mechanism by which judges
may review laws for constitutionality. Since the laws the Supreme So-
viet enacts always have the full approval of the Party, any judicial re-
view of these laws would amount to challenging the authority of the
Party. Hence, the system must reject, as it does, any notion of judicial
review.
Just as the Communist Party is the nucleus of the Soviet system,
the "eminent clergy" is the leading force of the Iranian society. The
aims set forth in the Iranian Constitution, for example, are to be
of October to the present .... " (quoting Brezhnev's May, 24 1977 C. C. Plenum Speech);
see also J. RESHETAR, supra note 47, at 133 ("The quasi-monopoly of power enjoyed by
the Soviet Communist party has been jealously guarded."); cf. Maggs, The Soviet Con-
stitution: In Order to Form a More Perfect Dictatorship, 10 HUM. RTS. 34, 36 (1982)
("[Tihe apparent contradiction between Article 2 that provides that all power in the
USSR belongs to the people, and Article 6 that makes the Communist Party the leading
and guiding force of Soviet society.").
81. KONST. SSSR art. 128.
82. M. GLENDON, supra note 76, at 716.
83. Id. at 716 n.3.
84. Id. at 719.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. KONST SSSR art. 108.
88. M. GLENDON, supra note 76, at 718.
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achieved through judgment made on a continuous basis by the "emi-
nent clergy."89 The Clergy occupies most of the institutional structure
that the Iranian Constitution has created to mold social forces toward
spiritual virtues based upon faith and piety and the struggle against all
forms of vice and corruption.90 For example, the ultimate governance
and leadership of the nation will always devolve upon an eminent
member of the Iranian Clergy, as has been the case with Imam
Khomeini. If no one eminent member of the Clergy qualifies to be the
Leader, then three or five eminent members of the Clergy will consti-
tute the Leadership Council to exercise the authority of the Leader."
The Leader/Leadership Council will have exclusive constitutional au-
thority to fill in some of the most powerful positions including the su-
preme command of the armed forces and the supreme judicial author-
ity of the country. 2 The Leader/Leadership Council also has the
authority to declare war.93 Thus, the Iranian Clergy has secured its
constitutional role as the Supreme Executive.
Furthermore, the Iranian Clergy has also retained the constitu-
tional prerogative to monitor the legislative process. Article 94 of the
Iranian Constitution requires that all legislation passed by the Na-
tional Consultative Assembly,9 4 an elected legislature, must be submit-
ted for approval to the Council of Guardians.' The Council of Guardi-
ans consists of twelve members, six of whom must be members of the
89. IRANIAN CONST. art. 2, para. 2, § 1.
90. Id. art 3, § 1. For a discussion of the clergy's rise to power and prominence in
Iran, see Hooglund, Social Origins of the Revolutionary Clergy, in THE IRANIAN REVOLU-
TION AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 74. see also; id. at 258.
91. IRANIAN CONST. art. 107.
92. Id. art. 110.
93. Id. art. 110, § 3(e). The declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of
armed forces is to based on the recommendation of the Supreme National Defense Coun-
cil. This Council consists of seven members: the President of the Islamic Republic, an
elected official who must be confirmed by the Leader/Leadership Council; the Prime
Minister; the Minister of Defense; the Chief of the General Staff, who must be appointed
by the Leader/Leadership Council; the Commander-in-Chief of the Corps of Guards of
the Islamic Revolution, who must be appointed by the Leader/Leadership Council; and
two advisors appointed by the Leader/Leadership Council. Id. art. 110, § 3(c). Since four
of the seven members of the Supreme National Defense Council are the appointees of
the Leader/Leadership Council, it may therefore be inferred that the Leader/Leadership
Council will have the ultimate authority to declare war and peace.
94. Id. art. 94; see also Flanz, Iran, A Comparative Analysis of the Constitution of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 10
(1980) (despite several constitutional provisions which seem to vest great powers in the
National Assembly, it can not really act with finality unless the Council of Guardians has
examined the pending legislation).
95. IRANIAN CONST. art. 94.
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Clergy; the other six Moslem jurists." Thus, while the Clergy officially
occupies half of the Council, the other half must be trained in Islamic
jurisprudence. It seems highly likely that only persons with clerical
training in Islamic jurisprudence will qualify as Moslem jurists. The
composition of the Council of Guardians indicates that it is in fact a
predominantly clerical institution.
The Council of Guardians has unprecedented constitutional au-
thority. First, if there is no Council of Guardians in existence, any leg-
islation passed by the National Assembly will lack the force of law.
This constitutional provision safeguards the existence of the Council of
Guardians and assures that the Clergy will play a permanent and con-
tinuous role in reviewing the legislation passed by the National Con-
sultative Assembly. Second, the Council of Guardians has the exclusive
authority to interpret the constitution." Third, it acts as the Supreme
Constitutional Court that previews legislation for its constitutionality.
In addition, the clerical members on the Council of Guardians have the
exclusive authority to review whether or not the legislation passed by
the National Assembly is compatible with Islamic principles." These
constitutional powers vest in the Clergy an authority not only to influ-
ence legislation but also to shape constitutional jurisprudence. Finally,
the Council of Guardians determines whether the candidates for the
presidency of the Republic have the requisite qualifications such as
trustworthiness, piety, and a convinced belief in the fundamental prin-
ciples of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official school of thought
of the country.100 This authority to screen out "unfit candidates" for
the presidency of the Republic (the second highest official position in
the country after the leadership ' ) before election takes place ' makes
the Council of Guardians a formidable clerical institution that has the
prerogative to control, if not veto, the democratic process.
It appears that in molding the Iranian society toward an authentic
Islamic community, the Iranian Clergy will play a permanent and per-
vasive role similar to the one that the Communist Party plays in the
Soviet Union. Just as members of the CPSU are trained in Marxist-
Leninist theory, members of the Clergy are trained in Islamic thought.
96. Id. art. 91.
97. Id. art. 93.
98. Id. art. 98.
99. Id. arts. 94, 96; see also Flanz, supra note 94, at 10.
100. IRANIAN CONST. art. 115.
101. Id. art. 113.
102. Id. arts. 110(d), 115; see also Flanz, supra note 94, at 1 ("If all these provisions
are put together, it becomes obvious that a regime of clerical supremacy, a kind of 'Mul-
laharacy' has been institutionalized.").
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Just as higher officials of the Party run the affairs of the Soviet Union,
eminent members of the Clergy run the affairs of the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Despite different visions of how their respective societies ought
to function and develop-one leading toward communism, the other
toward Islam-the Party in the Soviet Union and the Clergy in Iran
seem to be parallel institutions: both are the vanguard of their respec-
tive ideologies, both are the "brain, the honor and the conscience of
[their] epoch""'3 ; and, of course, both are vested with a quasi-monop-
oly of power.
IV. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
In economic and social areas, the primary object of distributive
justice is to arrange social institutions so that fundamental economic
rights and social advantages are equitably distributed among citizens.
The economic prosperity of a given society may be measured by the
total wealth that society as a whole has accumulated. But a wealthy
society may or may not be fair in distributing among its citizens the
economic benefits and opportunities available in the system. If the dis-
tribution of basic economic and social rights is unfair, distributive jus-
tice attempts to correct it.
Socialist thought has played a leading role in raising modern con-
sciousness regarding the importance of distributive justice. It rejects a
socioeconomic system which denies part of the population basic eco-
nomic and social rights such as work, housing, education and medical
care. While most societies accept some aspects of distributive justice,
socialist countries have been at the forefront in advocating the concept.
Almost all socialist countries recognize basic economic and social rights
of their citizens. In fact, they have launched an international campaign
to persuade other states to acknowledge that economic and social
rights are fundamental rights. By contrast, states with market econo-
mies resist a full recognition of such rights. 104
Without acknowledging the socialist genesis of social and economic
rights, the Iranian Constitution invokes Islam to justify their protec-
tion. Thus, the Iranian Constitution assimilates these rights into the
103. J. HAZARD, supra note 78, at 289 (quoting from Article VII of the PROGRAM OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION).
104. In a market-oriented democracy, elected officials make political decisions and
pass laws, but market forces determine the economic fortune or misfortune of individu-
als. Market economies are Janus-faced: both humane and cruel at the same time. The
people living under market economies enjoy the freedom to accumulate personal wealth,
but they run the risk of being without a job, without a house or even without food. In
order to control the extremes of a free market, almost all modern states regulate their
economies. See D. SALVATORE, MICROECONOMICs THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 1-3 (1986).
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Islamic conception of justice, suggesting that such rights may be pro-
tected within an Islamic state-without embracing socialism. On the
other hand, by protecting these rights, the Iranian Constitution seems
to propose to other Islamic states that even if these rights are rooted in
socialist doctrine, Islamic standards of justice are not opposed to the
protection of these rights; and if with respect to these rights, Islam and
socialism are compatible, so be it."'
The protection of economic and social rights in Iran, however,
does not appear to be as extensive as it is in the Soviet Union. This
discrepancy may have its roots in the different levels of development
between the two countries. After all, the Soviet Union has many more
resources than Iran does and, therefore, it can provide its citizens with
better economic and social protection. At this time, Iran does not have
adequate resources to provide every citizen with first-rate medical care,
adequate housing and meaningful higher education. A firm commit-
ment on the part of the Islamic state to provide these basic rights,
however, indicates that Islamic egalitarianism, at least in theory, is as
protective of these rights as is secular socialism. The following analysis
shows that Islam in Iran and socialism in the Soviet Union have almost
identical goals in the protection of economic and social rights.
A. The Right to Work
Socialist economy is founded upon the principle of socially useful
work, and Articles 40 and 60 of the Soviet Union Constitution state in
unequivocal terms that citizens of the Soviet Union have the right as
well as the duty to work. 10 6 The socialist state has the right to demand
labor from its citizens, just as citizens have the right to demand em-
ployment from the socialist state. This reciprocal obligation between
the socialist state and its citizens makes work the core value of the
socialist society. In fact, the social worth of an individual depends
upon the social utility of the work that the individual does: work deter-
105. According to the Iranian Constitution, capitalism is the source of many social
evils; it causes the intellectual and spiritual degeneration of society as a whole; and it
deprives part of the population of its basic human dignity by denying it fundamental
economic and social protection. Just like socialist states, therefore, Islamic Iran has
seized the means of production and vital national resources in order to provide citizens
with the necessary means of living, including work, housing, education and medical care.
See IRANIAN CONST. arts. 43, 44.
106. KONST. SSSR arts. 40, 60; see also M. GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA 30 (1987)
("There is virtually no unemployment. The state has assumed concern for ensuring em-
ployment. Even a person dismissed for laziness or a breach of labor discipline must be
given another job.").
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mines a person's status in society. 07 Moreover, socialist work is not
simply a means to make a living, it is the source of social wealth and of
the well-being of the people.108 Therefore, evasion of socially useful
work is incompatible with the principles of the socialist society.
"From each according to his abilities, to each according to his
work" is another socialist principle incorporated in the Soviet Consti-
tution.109 "From each according to his abilities" implies that the indi-
vidual would work according to the abilities he has. Individuals have
the right to choose their trade or profession in accordance with their
inclinations, abilities, training and education.1 0 This right is ensured
by providing free vocational and professional training. The state also
assists individuals in improvement of skills needed for a job, and pro-
vides job placement."1 The freedom to choose a job, however, is availa-
ble only if the job sought is socially needed. Even though social needs
determine the nature and number of jobs, the freedom to choose a job
is not totally illusory. After all, even in a market economy, all types of
jobs are not always available. "To each according to his work" implies
that remuneration for work would depend upon the quantity and qual-
ity of work; in other words, wages depend not only upon the amount of
output, but also upon the complexity and quality of work. Nonetheless,
the wages for any type of work do not fall below the state-established
minimum."1
The right to work does not seem to be a core value under the Ira-
nian Constitution. The constitutional provisions dealing with the right
to work are less emphatic as compared to those of the Soviet Constitu-
tion. For instance, work in Iran does not determine a person's social
status, as it does in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the Iranian Consti-
107. KONST. SSSR art. 14, para. 3.
108. Id.
109. Id. art. 14, para. 2.
110. Id. art. 40, para. 1.
111. Id. art. 40, para. 2; see Osakwe, Soviet Human Rights Law Under the USSR
Constitution of 1977: Theories, Realities and Trends, 56 TUL. L. REv. 249, 268 (1982);
see also J. HAZARD, supra note 78, at 212, suggesting that while the individual has a
choice of seeking employment outside of governmental organizations, in addition to
other systemic obstacles,
[sluch private enterprise . . . suffers further discouragement from the personal
income tax statutes. While all Soviet citizens are required to pay income tax
graduated in accordance with the amount of their income, the private enter-
priser is subjected to a higher rate than those employed by the state.... The
separation of those who will eventually be favored as the technicians, the manag-
ers and the intellectuals generally, from those who must remain throughout their
lives at the level of the manual laborer, occurs at an early age.
Id. at 214.
112. KONST SSSR art. 40, para. 1.
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tution undertakes to build an economy that will create conditions for
full employment. Just like the Soviet Union, the Iranian government
controls a huge public sector, and thus it is able to provide significant
employment. The constitution, however, requires the state to refrain
from becoming a monopolistic employer.1 ' Thus, even though the
state owns considerable means of employment, it is under no obligation
to provide jobs to all. The provision seems to have been added to pro-
tect employment in the private sector, which is concomitantly prohib-
ited from denying individuals the opportunity to work. '1  To further
expand the means of employment, cooperatives have been established
to create jobs for those who are able to work but lack the means."'
The government may also grant interest-free loans to individuals, to
help them establish small businesses. 16 Thus, unlike the Soviet Union
Constitution, the Iranian Constitution protects small enterprises
owned by individuals, and thereby adds a touch of capitalism to its
economic system. Yet the private sector remains limited in its scope,
since Article 43 of the Iranian Constitution forbids the concentration
of wealth in private hands."7
Article 28 of the Iranian Constitution grants citizens the right to
choose employment provided it is not contrary to Islamic principles,
the public interest, or the rights of others.' Even though the govern-
ment may create job opportunities bearing in mind the needs of soci-
ety, "'9 the Iranian Constitution does not specifically espouse the con-
cept of socially useful work. Nor does it create a duty to work. In fact,
compelling anyone to engage in a particular job is prohibited.2 0 On the
other hand, while the Soviet Union Constitution undertakes to provide
professional training and guidance to facilitate individuals finding jobs
of their choosing, the Iranian Constitution assumes no such responsi-
bility. The Iranian government, however, has a duty to provide every
citizen with the opportunity to work, and to create equal conditions for
obtaining it.'2 ' In order to create equal conditions for employment, it
may be argued, the government may have to provide assistance to
those who have equal inclinations and abilities but lack the means to
113. IRANIAN CONST. art. 43, § 2.
114. Id. art. 43, § 3.
115. Id. art. 43, § 2.
116. Id.
117. Id. art. 43.
118. Id. art. 28, para. 1.
119. Id. art. 28, para. 2.
120. Id. art. 43, § 4.
121. Id. art. 28, para. 2.
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perform the same job.122
B. The Right to Housing
Both constitutions recognize the right to housing. In the Soviet
Union, the right to housing is a vested right: the citizens have a right
to demand and the state has an obligation to provide housing.'2" The
Soviet state has undertaken a number of measures to provide housing
to all. It develops new housing projects and manages the already ex-
isting socially-owned housing. Newly built dwellings are distributed
among the people on a fair basis and under public control. The state
encourages and provides assistance for cooperative and individual
house construction. In addition, to make housing available, the state
may fix low rents and low charges for utility services. Citizens are
under an obligation to take good care of the housing allocated to
them.'24
The Iranian Constitution also recognizes the right of every citizen
and family to own a dwelling.1" Perhaps due to limited resources, the
state has not undertaken a positive obligation to provide housing to all.
Thus, under the Iranian Constitution, the right to housing is not yet a
vested right; it is at best an executory right that may vest in the future
when the state will have sufficient resources to meet its obligation to
all. The state, however, assumes the responsibility to implement this
principle in stages, according priority to those whose need is the great-
est, in particular the rural population and agricultural workers. 2 ' In
addition, the constitution promises not to disturb an individual's ex-
isting residence. 2 ' Citizens may establish a residence in their preferred
location.
C. Health Care and Social Insurance
Both constitutions confer on their citizens a right to health care
and social insurance. The right to health care in the Soviet Union is
ensured by free and qualified medical assistance provided by state
122. Id. art. 43, § 3. In this provision, there is some indication that the government
might help individuals improve their skills.
123. KONST SSSR art. 44.
124. Id. art. 44, para. 2; see also Osakwe, supra note 111, at 270. But see J. RESHETAR,
supra note 47, at 244 ("Government-operated housing provides a means of claiming that
Soviet workers have a real income that is greater than their money income because much
of the housing cost (above the nominal rents paid by tenants) is really a form of social
benefit.").
125. IRANIAN CONST. art. 31.
126. Id.
127. Id. arts. 31, 33.
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health facilities.' But the Soviet Constitution goes beyond simply
providing medical treatment services to its citizens. It looks toward
protecting the future health of its citizens through the development
and improvement of safety and sanitation of the workplace and
through carrying out broad prophylactic measures including the re-
search to control disease and to ensure citizens a long and active life. It
prohibits child labor 2' and provides special care for the health of the
rising generation.' s The right to social insurance has been granted to
provide maintenance and care for the elderly, the sick, and the dis-
abled. In addition, job placement is provided for the partially disabled.
Maintenance is also provided to a family that has lost its
breadwinner.'
Although the provision for health care and social security con-
tained in the Iranian Constitution is much less detailed than its Soviet
counterpart, it appears to confer similar benefits on Iranian citizens.
The constitution promises to provide health services, medicine and
medical care. Social security benefits are available on retirement, in old
age and in the event of unemployment, disability and destitution. All
these benefits constitute a universal right, and the government is under
a constitutional obligation to assure the foregoing rights and financial
protection by drawing on the national income and individual
contributions.1
32
D. The Right to Education
There is a right to education under both constitutions. In the So-
viet Union, the right is ensured by free provision of all forms of educa-
tion. Secondary education is compulsory for Soviet youth. Vocational
and higher education emphasize the development of practical skills
and production. In order to provide the means of education, the state
has set up facilities for self-education as well as for extramural, corre-
spondence and evening classes; it also provides free textbooks, state
stipends and other grants. Furthermore, the students have the oppor-
tunity to attend schools where their native language is the medium of
instruction. 3 3
128. KONST. SSSR art. 42, para. 2.
129. Id. While prohibiting child labor, it allows that children may do some physical
work as part of the school curriculum. Id.
130. Id. For a general comment on health care services in the Soviet Union, see J.
RESHETAR, supra note 47, at 245-46.
131. KONST. SSSR art. 43, para. 1.
132. IRANIAN CONST. art. 29.
133. KONST. SSSR art. 45, para. 2. On the right to education, see Osakwe, supra note
111, at 270-71 ("The right of Soviet citizens to free education, however, does not imply a
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Likewise, the Iranian Constitution provides all citizens with free
education and training through middle school. There is nothing in the
constitution, however, that mandates compulsory education. Even
though universal free education at all levels and the facilitation and
expansion of higher education are the future goals, 34 it seems that Iran
at the present time does not have the resources to provide elaborate
facilities for free vocational and higher education.
While the Soviet Constitution recognizes and promotes several re-
gional languages by allowing students to learn in their native tongues,
the Iranian Constitution attempts to create a linguistic unity among its
citizens. For instance, the official language and script of Iran is Persian,
and schoolbooks are required to be in this language and script."'5
Schools, however, may use regional languages for teaching literature
written in them.'3" Recognizing that Islamic learning and culture are
deeply rooted in Arabic, the language of the Koran, the constitution
mandates that Arabic must be taught in all classes from elementary
school through middle school, and in all areas of study."'
V. CIVIL AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS
For citizens of any country, civil and political freedoms (such as
freedoms of speech, religion and association) are as important as eco-
nomic and social rights. Although most modern states recognize the
significance of both civil and political freedoms and social and eco-
nomic rights, they are reluctant to provide the fullest possible protec-
tion to both; instead, they emphasize one or the other. Market-oriented
right to be admitted to any particular educational institution of their choice."); J.
RESHETAR, supra note 47, at 273 ("While education is free and in theory accessible to all,
in practice admission is limited to those who can compete effectively or whose families
have influence and means."). When Article 45 (the right to education) is read in conjunc-
tion with Article 40, which provides the right to work for every citizen "with due account
of the needs of society," the significance of the provision of both rights is minimized.
134. IRANIAN CONST. art. 30; see also H. AFSHAR, supra note 61, at 246-49 (suggesting
that the only learning available to the citizens is that which furthers or does not appear
to challenge the Islamic views). Afshar states:
Ironically technical subjects which depend largely on Western research and edu-
cational materials have now been declared sufficiently Islamic to be acceptable
by the government, but Humanities which are rooted in the Iranian culture re-
main unacceptable. Part of the problem is, of course, the 2500 years of Iranian
history which has been rejected by the religious establishment, partly because it
pre-dates Islam, but ostensibly because it is a long history of oppressive royal
rule and unacceptable to the revolutionary spirit of Iran today.
Id. at 249.
135. IRANIAN CONST. art. 15.
136. Id.
137. Id. art. 16.
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democracies, for example, are willing to protect large civil and political
freedoms, but fall short of acknowledging economic and social rights.
Socialist states, on the other hand, guarantee economic and social
rights, but curtail civil and political freedoms.
Even though the Islamic Republic of Iran does not claim to be a
socialist state, its constitution, perhaps following the tradition of so-
cialist states, puts several constraints on civil and political freedoms.
These constraints are designed to defend and promote Islamic social-
ism. Just as the Soviet Constitution subordinates the exercise of free-
doms of speech, religion and association to the attainment of commu-
nist goals, the Iranian Constitution subjects these freedoms to the
advancement of both distributive justice and Islamic morality. Thus, in
both Iran and the Soviet Union, citizens have the full freedom of
speech to praise the ideology, but none to reject it. Such restrictions on
civil and political rights are understandable because the Islamic regime
in Iran, just like the communist regime in the Soviet Union, seems to
be both self-righteous and fearful. It is self-righteous because it be-
lieves it has been founded upon an immutable truth (Islam), the rejec-
tion of which is sacrilegious; it is fearful because it believes it has been
surrounded by enemies, the suppression of which is indispensable.
A. Equal Protection of Laws
The Soviet Constitution grants citizens equal protection of laws,
without distinction of origin, social or property status, race or national-
ity, sex, education, language, attitude to religion, type and nature of
occupation, domicile or other status.13 ' This principle of equality pro-
tects equal rights of citizens in all fields of economic, political, social
and cultural life. The Soviet Union is a heterogeneous country where
citizens have diverse racial, linguistic and cultural backgrounds. More-
over, some regions in the Soviet Union are economically more devel-
oped than others. Under these conditions, the principle of equality has
a special significance for less developed regions. In order to implement
the principle of equality, the Soviet Constitution recognizes a policy of
all-around development and drawing together of all regions and na-
tionalities.13 Furthermore, in order to achieve national solidarity, citi-
zens are educated in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist inter-
nationalism; and, any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness,
hostility or contempt is punishable by law. 40
Under the Soviet Constitution, women and men have equal
138. KONST. SSSR art. 34, para. 1.
139. Id. art. 36.
140. Id.
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rights."" In order to ensure gender equality, women and men have
equal access to education and vocational and professional training.
They also enjoy equal opportunities in employment, remuneration and
promotion. Women with children have special protection: expectant
mothers are granted paid leaves and other benefits; mothers with chil-
dren receive assistance in job placement; and those with small children
are entitled to reduced working time.1"
The Iranian Constitution also embodies the principle of equality
without distinction as to ethnic, family or tribal origins; and, factors
such as color, race and language do not bestow any privilege. 143 While
all citizens enjoy equal protection of laws, the Iranian Constitution
specifically mentions equality between men and women.' 4' The princi-
ple of gender equality, however, is subordinated to Islamic standards.
Even though Islamic standards recognize the equality of women in
many areas of life, it is doubtful that Iranian women enjoy the same
rights as Soviet women do."" Still, the Iranian Constitution promises
to create an environment favorable to the personal growth of women
and to restore their material and spiritual rights. It also promises to
protect mothers, particularly during pregnancy and child-rearing.
Moreover, special insurance is available for widows and aged and desti-
tute women."'
B. Freedom of Speech
The Soviet Constitution guarantees to Soviet Union citizens free-
doms of speech and the press. The constitution ensures the exercise of
these freedoms by the broad dissemination of information, and by the
opportunity to use the press, television and radio. 1 7 The same provi-
sion that guarantees these freedoms, however, contains a "claw-back
clause" I"8 that limits their free exercise. This claw-back clause allows
141. Id. art. 35, para. 1.
142. Id. art. 35, para. 2.
143. IRANIAN CONST. art. 19.
144. Id. art. 20.
145. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 431 n.3 (1987)
(Several Muslim states have made reservations to the U.N. Convention on Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, arguing that some provisions of this Convention are
contrary to the Koran or Islamic law).
146. IRANIAN CONST. art. 21, § 4.
147. KONST. SSSR art. 50.
148. A "claw-back" clause may be defined as a provision that limits or qualifies a
given civil and political right. For example, Article 50 of the USSR Constitution pro-
vides: "In accordance with the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and
develop the socialist system, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech, of
the press, of assembly, of meetings, and of street marches, and demonstrations." Id. art.
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freedom of speech and of the press only in accordance with the peo-
ple's interests and for the purpose of strengthening and developing the
socialist system.1 4 Similarly, citizens of the Soviet Union are guaran-
teed freedom of scientific, technical and artistic creation, but these too
must be "in accordance with the goals of communist construction. 15 0
Under the Iranian Constitution, free expression of ideas through
publications and the press is a public right. As with the Soviet Consti-
tution, the claw-back clause in the Iranian Constitution allows the ex-
ercise of this freedom only insofar as it is neither contrary to Islamic
principles nor detrimental to public rights. 5' Further, the mass media
(radio and television) are allowed the free diffusion of information and
views, but only in accordance with Islamic principles.' The media
function under the joint supervision of the judiciary, the legislature
and the executive.
53
C. Freedom of Religion
The Soviet Constitution guarantees the right of citizens to profess
any religion and to conduct religious worship. This freedom of religion
includes the freedom to reject any religion. Therefore, citizens may re-
fuse to profess any religion and may even engage in atheistic propa-
ganda. 54 Even though Soviet law grants citizens the right to profess
any religion, the socialist ideology tends to view religion as a set of
50, para. 1. In this article, the clause "In accordance with the interests of the people and
in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system" is the claw-back clause that
limits and qualifies the freedom stated in that Article.
149. See J. HAZARD, supra note 78, at 63 (arguing that Soviet authorities have used
the suppression of speech against citizens who have no desire to upset the regime but
who merely wanted to grumble against some detail immensely important to them); see
also Osakwe, supra note 111, at 272-75.
150. KONST. SSSR art. 47, para. 1; see also Osakwe, supra note 111, at 271 ("The
Soviet political system operates on the philosophical premise that science, technology
and art must serve the needs and interests of the people and promote the political goals
of the society. An artistic creation that does not project socialist realism is not within the
coverage of Article 47.").
151. IRANIAN CONST. art. 24.
152. While Islamic principles may deem it appropriate to prohibit the publication
and distribution within Iran of a book viewed as blasphemous to the doctrine of Islam,
the act of issuing a death threat against the author who happens to be a citizen of an-
other country stretches the Islamic concept of freedom of speech to an unacceptable
limit. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
153. IRANIAN CONST. art. 175, pars. 1; see also H. AFSHAR, supra note 61, at 249-51
(showing the importance of the press to the success of the Islamic Revolution and the
Islamic government's control of the forces by banning all publications and asking pub-
lishers to reapply to the government to obtain the right to publish).
154. KONST. SSSR art. 52, pars. 1.
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unscientific beliefs that confuses the theory of social development.
Moreover, organized religions present a real challenge to the authority
of the Soviet leadership. The state therefore allows and encourages "a
vigorous campaign against religious belief on the ground that the natu-
ral sciences disprove the existence of God."' 5 5 The constitution further
states that in the Soviet Union, there is a separation between the state
and the church as well as between the school and the church. Under
this doctrine of separation, the state cannot establish and the schools
cannot teach religion in any form.
The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Shi'i school of
thought. While the Iranian Constitution declares that this school of
thought shall remain the immutable official school of Iran, other Is-
lamic schools of thought are to be accorded full respect. The followers
of each Islamic school of thought are free to act, worship, marry, di-
vorce, inherit, bequest and receive religious education according to
their beliefs. The courts will respect and enforce the respective juris-
prudence of each school of thought on matters of personal status (mar-
riage, divorce, inheritance and bequests). In addition, in areas of Iran
where the followers of a certain Islamic school of thought constitute
the majority, local regulations may be enacted in accordance with the
respective school of thought. 5 '
While all Islamic schools of thought enjoy equal protection, there
are only three other religious minorities that the Iranian Constitution
recognizes: Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians. 5 " These recognized reli-
gious minorities have the constitutional right to freely perform their
religious ceremonies and may act according to their beliefs in matters
of personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance and bequests) and
may receive religious education. Even though a separate provision in
the constitution requires that the government and all muslims treat
non-muslims in an ethical fashion and respect their human rights,'56 it
is not clear from the text of the provision whether the phrase "non-
muslims" include all religious minorities or only the recognized ones.
Obviously, the Iranian Constitution rejects the separation of state
and the religion of Islam. The principles of Islam determine the nature
of the state, its laws and its institutions. Likewise, there is no separa-
tion between schools and the religion of Islam. Islamic education is an
inseparable part of education and children are required to learn
Arabic, the language of the Koran and of Islamic learning and
155. J. HAZARD, supra note 7, at 233. For similar comments, see J. RESHETAR, supra
note 47, at 290.
156. IRANIAN CONST. art. 12.
157. Id. art. 13.
158. Id. art. 14.
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culture." 9
It may be argued that the freedom of religion under the two con-
stitutions is uneven, if not fundamentally different. For instance, the
Soviet Union Constitution allows the propagation of atheism, the Ira-
nian Constitution does not. In the Soviet Union, the state is separated
from religion; in Iran, it is not. But there is another way to look at this
comparison. Under both constitutions, neither the state nor schools are
separated from the state ideology. In the Soviet Union, both the state
and schools are inseparable from communism; in Iran, they are insepa-
rable from Islam. In other words, communism in the Soviet Union and
Islam in Iran serve similar purposes: they define the nature of their
state; they determine the identity of their society; they shape the fu-
ture of their destiny.
D. Freedom of Association
Human beings are by nature associative; they form groups to pro-
tect and advance their political, social, cultural and economic interests.
While in market-oriented democratic states, group activity is essential
both to conducting economic enterprise and to influencing government
decision-making processes including law making, in ideological states
group activity is allowed to promote ideological interests. Accordingly,
any group formation or associative activity incompatible with or repug-
nant to state ideology is prohibited. In both Iran and the Soviet Union,
the right to associate is subject to the respective ideologies.
In the Soviet Union, the right to associate in public organizations
is granted provided these organizations serve the aims of building com-
munism. 60 If an associative body promotes communism, its right to
exist, its political activity and its initiative are protected. In fact, the
state encourages the formation of associative bodies that provide con-
centrated activity to achieve ideological goals and weld people together
with ideological consciousness. In addition to this right to association,
the Soviet Constitution grants citizens the right to submit proposals to
state bodies and public organizations for improving their activity.'
Such proposals may even criticize state bodies and public organizations
for any shortcomings in their work. This right to submit proposals and
to criticize official shortcomings is indeed a right to petition except
159. Id. art. 16.
160. KONST. SSSR art. 51, para. 1; see also J. HAZARD, supra note 78, at 66 (sug-
gesting that in making sure the exercise of this right of association serves the aim of
building communism, the Soviet state requires every association, regardless of purpose,
to be licensed).
161. KONST. SSSR art. 49, para. 1.
19881
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
that the right must be exercised within the ideological confines. To fa-
cilitate the exercise of this right, the constitution forbids any persecu-
tion for criticism.
Under the Iranian Constitution, the right to association has simi-
lar ideological constraints: citizens have a right to form political and
professional associations provided they do not violate the criteria of
Islam, or the basis of the Islamic Republic."8 2 Even public gatherings
and marches may freely be held provided they are not detrimental to
the fundamental principles of Islam.' 6 ' These constraints on the right
to association are necessary to preserve the Islamic roots of the
Republic.
VI. FOREIGN POLICY
Both constitutions contain a separate chapter on foreign policy.
The Soviet Constitution sets forth guidelines that would determine the
Soviet Union's relations with other states. Most of these guidelines
simply restate broad and well-recognized principles of international
law, such as sovereign equality, territorial integrity of states, peaceful
settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, the right of
self-determination, fulfillment in good faith of obligations arising from
international agreements, etc.'" These principles of international law
are derived from the Charter of the United Nations, to which the So-
viet Union is a signatory.' This constitutional recognition of the basic
principles of international law is designed to show both to the Soviet
people and to the international community that the Soviet Union con-
ducts a principled foreign policy. 6
Even if the restatement into the Soviet Constitution of the basic
principles of international law is unfeigned, the Soviet Constitution
contains several other foreign policy guidelines that the government
may invoke to justify its deviation from the standards of international
law. For example, the constitution allows the government to support
"the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress."'1
At one level, supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation
is a high moral principle that may even be lawful under international
law. At another level, however, the standard may be easily abused not
162. IRANIAN CONST. art. 26.
163. Id. arts. 26, 27.
164. KONST. SSSR art. 29.
165. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state .... ").
166. This author believes that this has not always been the case.
167. KONST. SSSR art. 28, para. 2.
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only to intervene into the internal affairs of another country, but to
outright violate its territorial integrity. This pretext is also available to
support socialist groups in foreign countries that are allegedly fighting
for "social progress. "168
Furthermore, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at
consolidating the positions of world socialism.16 9 In order to achieve
this goal, the Soviet Union promotes and strengthens friendship with
other socialist countries, and takes an active part in socialist economic
integration. "' These foreign policy standards may explain the Soviet
support for socialist regimes all over the world. Again, socialist coun-
tries may have good reasons to create and protect their group solidarity
and the Soviet Union, being the first and probably the most prosperous
socialist country, may have the best of motives to share its experience
with emergent or less prosperous socialist countries. But this principle
of socialist internationalism provides the Soviet Union with a justifica-
tion, if not self-righteous authority, to play the role of a "big brother"
and thus establish its domination over the socialist community.
While the Soviet Constitution couches its foreign policy principles
in terms of international law, the Iranian Constitution does not even
use the phrase "international law" in its dealing with foreign policy.17'
Instead it invokes a moral principle as the ideal principle of Iran's for-
eign policy: the universal happiness of all mankind.1 72 It further states
that the attainment of an independent, free and just government is the
right of all peoples of the world . 73 Accordingly, it rejects all forms of
domination. Under the constitution, the government cannot lawfully
enter into any agreement that would impose foreign domination over
the natural resources, economy, army or culture of Iran.174 In order to
prevent foreign domination and to preserve an independent govern-
ment, the constitution mandates that Iran adopt a policy of non-align-
ment with respect to superpowers.' This strong emphasis on an inde-
pendent government free from all foreign influence comes from a belief
generally held by the Iranian public that under the Shah, Iran was
neither free nor independent of foreign influence.
Even though rejection of foreign domination is the main theme of
Iran's foreign policy, the constitution contains other foreign policy
168. Id.
169. Id. art. 30.
170. Id. arts. 28, para. 2; 30.
171. IRANIAN CONST. arts. 152-155.
172. Id. art. 154, para. 1.
173. Id. art. 154, para. 2.
174. Id. art. 153.
175. Id. art. 152.
19881
N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
principles similar to those embodied in the Soviet Constitution. For
example, it espouses the principle of complete non-interference in the
internal affairs of other countries, but it also promises to support the
just struggles of the oppressed and deprived people in every corner of
the globe."" Thus, both constitutions modify the principle of non-in-
terference and create an exception to support the struggle of the peo-
ples for freedom and social justice.
Thus, just as the Soviet foreign policy promotes the principle of
socialist internationalism, the Iranian foreign policy appears to support
the idea of Islamic internationalism. While the principle of socialist in-
ternationalism protects socialist governments, the Iranian view of Is-
lamic internationalism is to protect "all Muslims" rather than their
governments. 7 This distinction is significant. It appears that Iran
might encourage "all Muslims" to work towards instituting, in their
respective countries, a form of government based on the concept of Is-
lamic egalitarianism. This might justify the exportation of the Iranian
Revolution to other Islamic communities. The Iranian Clergy seems to
believe that only when other Islamic states have founded their govern-
ments on the principles of Islamic egalitarianism can there emerge a
true and meaningful Islamic solidarity. In order to justify Islamic in-
ternationalism, the Iranian Constitution invokes the following injunc-
tion of the Koran: "And we wish to show favor to those who have been
oppressed upon earth, and to make of them leaders and inheritors.' 7 8
VII. CONCLUSION
The Iranian Constitution is founded upon the concept of Islamic
egalitarianism. Islamic egalitarianism is distinguishable from secular
socialism in that it is a spiritual ideology that builds a permanent rela-
tionship between man and God and provides a moral structure for in-
dividual and collective behavior. Yet it shares several characteristics
with secular socialism contained in the 1977 Soviet Union Constitu-
tion. Just like the Soviet Union Constitution, the Iranian Constitution
rejects capitalist modes of production and distribution, and it allows
the Islamic state to control the main means of production. Further, it
creates a centralized structure of authority whereby the state power
remains with the guardians of ideology who give direction and stability
to policies based upon Islam and distributive justice. The Iranian Con-
176. Id. art. 154, para. 2.
177. Id. art. 152. Islamic teachings have always emphasized the unity of the umma
(the community ofbelievers). See Dessouki, The Islamic Resurgence: Sources, Dynamics
and Implications, in ISLAMIc RESURGENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD 6 (A. Dessouki ed. 1982).
178. Koran 28:5. This verse is cited in the preamble to the Iranian Constitution.
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stitution assumes to provide all citizens with the basic necessities of
life, but it restricts civil and political freedoms, which may be exercised
only within the constraints of Islamic morality. In foreign policy, the
Iranian Constitution promises to strengthen the international Islamic
community and provides assistance to the oppressed people of the
world.
Islamic egalitarianism embodied in the Iranian Constitution
presents an alternative to both capitalism and secular socialism and
redefines the obligations of an Islamic state. Although some Islamic
states have experimented in the past with Islamic egalitarianism, the
Iranian example is unique because Islamic egalitarianism in Iran has
the blessings of fundamentalists who might have been its natural oppo-
nents. If the Iranian Revolution succeeds in establishing a stable and
workable constitutional system, it may propose a similar model to
other Islamic communities. This success may also give a new life and
perhaps revitalized respectability to the idea of joining Islam with
modern egalitarian principles.
But right now, the Iranian Revolution is still fragile. How the
revolution will unfold itself in the future and how history will judge it
are questions that invite both conjecture and curiosity. Iran is emerg-
ing out of its international isolation, and the brutal war between Iran
and Iraq has seemingly come to an end. Nonetheless, the Iranian
revolution has few friends and many enemies. It has not yet solved the
country's economic problems; its record on human rights remains sul-
lied. Even if it succeeds in protecting itself from external enemies, it
may collapse under its own weight, particularly if the government
alienates its people. Should the revolution falter and Islamic egalitari-
anism disintegrate, the Iranian Constitution may eventually find its
place in the catacomb of failed ideas.
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